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In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of
“meshed architecture” as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We
start with an account of various conceptions of situated cognition using the distinction
between functional integration, which characterizes how an agent dynamically organizes
to couple with its environment, and task dependency, which specifies various
constraints and structures imposed by the environment (see Slors, 2019). We then
exploit the concept of a meshed architecture as a model that provides a more focused
analysis of situated cognition and performance. Through this analysis, we show how
the model of meshed architecture can be enhanced through (1) the involvement of a
more complex set of cognitive processes, (2) a form of intrinsic control, (3) the influence
of affective factors, and (4) the role of factors external to the performer. The aim of
this paper, then, is twofold: first to work out an enhanced conception of the model
of meshed architecture by taking into consideration a number of factors that clarify its
situated nature, and second, to use this model to provide a richer and more definitive
understanding of the meaning of situated cognition. Thus, we argue that this reciprocal
analysis gives us a very productive way to think about how various elements come
together in skilled action and performance but also a detailed way to characterize
situated cognition.
Keywords: situated cognition, performance, task dependency, body schema, functional integration, meshed
architecture
WHAT’S THE SITUATION?
Embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive approaches to cognition comprise a loose-knit group
of research endeavors that endorse the view that the organism’s body and parts of its environment
actively participate in the execution of cognition. They differ in their views about how mind
and world are entangled. For example, some endorse epistemological inseparability (i.e., no full
understanding of cognitive processes is possible by studying exclusively what is occurring inside the
head) while others also endorse ontological inseparability (i.e., the realizers of cognitive processes
can sometimes include parts of the body and the environment) (Varga, 2019). Most would agree that
such approaches can be grouped along these two claims, but some have argued that the distinctions
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in the literature are muddled (Rowlands, 2010). For example,
some maintain that work in situated cognition investigates
cognitive extensions (Clark and Wilson, 2009) while others
consider extended cognition as a distinct class of situated
cognition (Robbins and Aydede, 2009, p. 3).
Situated cognition, however, can be considered a broad
umbrella term that covers all of these various approaches. As
such, it is multifaceted. We might think of it in terms of how
environmental features both constrain and enable our cognitive
processes. On the constraint side, we can think of various
material and structural features as directing us to a specific set of
affordances, not only for our perceptions and actions, but also for
our deliberations and imaginings. At the same time, these same
affordances are enabling of our actions and cognitive activities.
It is possible to think of these relations in terms of extended or
distributed cognition. Various instruments allow us to engage
in epistemic actions (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994), and for some
cognitive tasks, we require the use of such instruments. To do
the math, we may need paper, pencil, abacus, or some form of
machine. To solve a problem, we may rely not only on such tools
but also on other people or team members with whom to interact,
as well as on normative practices and institutions (understood as
cognitive institutions – see Gallagher, 2013; Slaby and Gallagher,
2015). At the same time, these practices and institutions may
define specific tasks and place limitations on how we approach
a problem or on our style of problem solving.
Thinking of situated cognition in this way, we can define our
cognitive engagements as spanning a range between functional
integration and task dependency. Marc Slors (2019) has recently
clarified these concepts in his analysis of cognitive institutions.
We think they can generalize to situated cognition more broadly.
Following Slors, for example, we can distinguish between (1) the
extended mind approach which starts from the single agent and
explains how institutions extend the agent’s cognition (Clark and
Chalmers, 1998) and (2) the distributed cognition or systems-
based approach that shows how cognitive systems emerge from
the integration of individual agents (Hutchins, 2014). In this
context, Slors defines functional integration as “the extent to
which the execution of tasks involves coupling with items
external to the brain and body” (Slors, 2019, p. 1189). A high
degree of functional integration means that the cognitive process
is constituted by this coupling such that without the external
resource, we would be unable to engage in the particular activity,
while low functional integration signifies an enabling relation
such that the external resource simply facilitates our activity. In
contrast, task dependency
is the extent to which the intelligibility of a task depends
on a larger whole of coordinated tasks. Task dependency is a
notion that is connected with coordination and planning. It is a
normative notion in the sense that high task dependency means
that tasks play specific roles in the overall organization of a
cognitive system or a cultural cognitive ecosystem, roles that can
be played properly or improperly (Slors, 2019, p. 1190).
The legal system, for example, understood as a cognitive
institution (Gallagher, 2013) is characterized by high task
dependency. Accordingly, to understand what an attorney does
requires an understanding of how that role is linked to the
roles played by other people, such as judges and clerks, as well
as to a codified body of laws and customs. What one might
accomplish in this system will depend upon the structure of
the particular situation that constitutes a social-normative or
institutional practice.
Situated cognition, then, can be categorized by varying degrees
of functional integration and task dependency (Table 1).
Embedded cognition is defined by a low functional integration
with various resources that nonetheless enables the performance
of cognitive activities and where such activities are intelligible
without reference to the institutional structure (low task
dependency). Distributed cognition, in contrast, involves the
right coupling between distributed components, such as artifacts
or other agents in a highly functionally integrated system that
also requires high task dependency such that the action of any
one individual cannot be understood without reference to others’
activities. Extended cognition (in Clark and Chalmers’ sense)
involves high functional integration. Otto, for example, is tightly
coupled with his notebook, which allows an extension of his
cognitive processes, even if writing and consulting a notebook
are not processes that necessarily depend on the roles or tasks
of others to be intelligible. “Symbiotic cognition,” as Slors terms
it, is found in cognitive institutions. In symbiotic cognition,
characterized by high task dependency, an individual’s cognitive
processes acquire meaning only in a matrix of interrelationships
with the activities of others but do not require a high degree of
functional integration.
Every participant in a symbiotic system profits from whatever
the system as a whole offers (e.g., education, justice, social
coordination) while contributing only a small part. The tasks, jobs
and roles of others in the system co-define and enable one’s own
task, but one does not have to perform them or even think about
them, while nevertheless benefiting from the overall outcome of
the system (Slors, 2019, p. 1198).
Although this is a productive analysis, it is an
oversimplification to think of cognitive institutions as strictly
symbiotic or characterized specifically in terms of high task
dependency (see Gallagher et al., 2019; Petracca and Gallagher,
2020). As Slors (2019, p. 1190) rightly indicates, “both functional
integration and task-dependency come in degrees,” and it
seems right to think that a cognitive institution, or situated
cognition more generally, will always involve varying degrees
of task dependency and functional integration (also see Slors,
2020). Furthermore, how one understands a system will depend
on where in the system one is looking or perhaps from what
epistemic perspective one is looking. Specifically, the distinction
between agent-centered and systems-based perspectives involves
TABLE 1 | Forms of situated cognition (from Slors, 2019, p. 1191).
Low functional
integration
High functional
integration
Low task dependency Embedded cognition Extended cognition
High task dependency Symbiotic cognition Distributed cognition
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different epistemological perspectives that may serve different
research agendas but does not necessarily define particular
institutional processes. From a systems perspective, a system
may involve high task dependency. But from an agent-centered
perspective, one may see a significant degree of functional
integration that defines that agent’s work.
To motivate our strategy of looking at performance studies to
provide some detail in this regard, consider that the notion of
task dependency, where action may be defined by a particular
role in the performance, is clearly relevant to different types
of performance. Of course, task dependency will vary across
different types of performance, but different tasks or roles,
performed by specific participants, may still be clearly defined,
for example, when one is playing football, dancing or acting
on stage, or playing a concert in the Sydney Opera House or
in the local pub. Specifically, one will find variations in the
proportion of functional integration versus task dependency. In
a standard tonal jazz performance, for example, task dependency
may take the lead. There is a structure to the performance –
first, playing the “head,” a statement of the main melodic line;
then solos where each performer takes turns following rules
concerning harmonic and relatively consistent chord changes;
and then, after each performer has taken one or two choruses,
the group plays the outro, to end the piece. If one is performing
a solo improvisation, without an ensemble, team, or musical
group, then task dependency may approach zero, and functional
integration may be everything. The latter is a different kind of
situation from performing with others; but in each case, the
performance and the cognition that goes with it are situated
within some variable proportion of functional integration and
task dependency.
Functional integration defines how individual agents engage
with the various elements of the system and, in so doing, enact the
system, which loops back to define performance in specific tasks.
An explanation that simply highlights the distinction between
functional integration and task dependency, however, remains
a somewhat abstract account of situated cognition and is not
sufficient to account for how situated agents actually couple
to environments or how tasks that are institutionally or more
broadly socially, culturally, or normatively defined actually shape
that environment. At best, it is an initial specification that
requires a more detailed account of how it all works. That is,
even if an analysis in terms of functional integration and task
dependency provides a productive way to categorize different
conceptions of situated cognition, it does not explain precisely
how an agent functionally couples with the environment or enters
into task-related processes. For example, an adequate concept
of functional integration needs to include more than just an
account of organism–environment coupling; it also needs to
explain how the agentive organism itself is integrated so as to
facilitate this coupling.
In the remainder of the paper, we want to provide an account
of what it is to be a situated agent engaged in some task or
performance that involves varying degrees of task dependency
and functional integration. To do this, we turn to the model
of a meshed architecture developed in performance studies. We
propose that by going into some detail about this model, we can
flesh out some of the important aspects of situated cognition. In
this respect, we argue that there can be a reciprocal or mutual
enlightenment between studies of performance and the theory of
situated cognition.
MESHED ARCHITECTURE IN
PERFORMANCE
As long as an agent is not simply a cog in the machine (an
indifferent functional part of the system), one can think of her
as a skilled performer or as someone who practices some degree
of skilled activity. As we will see, this is one way to characterize
functional integration, and it involves something more than
simply fulfilling a predefined task in an automatic way, although
from a systems perspective, this may sometimes appear to be what
is happening. In this respect, we want to rule out the idea of a
zero-intelligence agent (see Gode and Sunder, 1993) – that is,
an agent who, to perform a task, acts in a purely automatic way
and whose performance would involve no cognitive contribution.
Functional integration is something more than this and involves
a process that is both more complex and more subtle. To make
this clear, we turn to a debate in performance theory and the
specific model of a meshed architecture to clarify the perspective
of a situated agent.
In the area of performance studies, Hubert Dreyfus’ well-
known analysis of expertise would come close to the zero-
intelligence agent. Dreyfus argued that expert performance
involves being mindlessly in the flow, since any form of reflective
cognition would be disruptive of performance. He regards
subjectivity as a lingering ghost of the mental and denies that
there is any awareness in absorbed coping (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 373).
On this model, as long as things go smoothly, the agent can be
on automatic pilot; there is no need for self-consciousness – the
latter is called into action only when the agent detects something
going wrong (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 377; see Dreyfus, 2005). At the
extreme, this view suggests that expert performance is simply a
mindless being in the flow. The elite Sri Lankan cricketer Kumar
Sangakkara expresses this view: “Basically in batting, you have
to be mindless. You’ve done all the practice, you have your
muscle memory and your reflexes are more than quick to deal
with any kind of delivery. You’ve got to let your body do all
those things by itself without letting your mind take control”
(Sadikot, 2014).
In contrast, empirical and phenomenological studies of
athletics, dance, theater, and musical performance suggest that
performance is not mindless; there is always a cognitive element
in performance. Moreover, the cognition involved is always a
situated cognition. For example, John Sutton et al. (2011) develop
a mindful conception of expert skilled performance. It is not just
trained habit that allows an expert player of cricket or baseball to
hit a hard fastball (which may be traveling at 140 km/h). In order
to hit the ball with precision to a particular location, the batter
must draw on current context and the conditions that are relevant
to the game. Her performance is “fast enough to be a reflex, yet
it is perfectly context-sensitive. This kind of context sensitivity
requires some forms of mindedness – [an] interpenetration of
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thought and action exemplified in open skills” (Sutton et al., 2011,
p. 80). The expert batter cannot be on automatic pilot; being on
automatic pilot would reduce functional integration to being just
one piece of machinery fit to task. Batting skill within the context
of a game, for example, involves some mindful strategic sense of
where the batter will hit the ball in any particular instance.
Skill is not a matter of bypassing explicit thought, to let
habitual actions run entirely on their own, but of building and
accessing flexible links between knowing and doing. The forms
of thinking and remembering which can, in some circumstances,
reach in to animate the subtle kinesthetic mechanisms of skilled
performance must themselves be redescribed as active and
dynamic (Sutton et al., 2011, p. 95).
Automaticity, therefore, cannot address variability or
differences in the agentive situation. Skill and innovative
performance require flexibility – the expert batter is aware of
the specifics of the situation (including his own skills) and
is capable of on-the-fly, explicit, considered awareness which
allows for strategic decision making in the flow of performance.
This includes elective “target control for some features, such as
goal, one or more parameters of execution, like timing, force, a
variation in the sequence, and so on” (Christensen et al., 2016,
p. 50). In this respect, “expert performers precisely counteract
automaticity, because it limits their ability to make specific
adjustments on the fly. . .. Just because skillful action is usually
pre-reflective, it does not have to be mindless” (Sutton et al.,
2011, p. 95).
To say that functional integration is something more than
automaticity in the context of skilled performance, then,
motivates several questions. First, what are the cognitive
processes involved, and second, how precisely do they “reach in”
to the basic body-schematic processes of skilled performance?
Christensen et al. (2016) offer a helpful answer to the second
question, developing the concept of a meshed architecture to
explain the integration of perceptual and cognitive elements with
body-schematic motoric processes. On this view, performance is
neither fully automatic nor fully cognitive. They develop a hybrid
view according to which “cognitive control reduces during skill
learning as automatic control comes to play an increasing role,
but cognitive control continues to make a substantial positive
contribution at advanced levels of skill” (Christensen et al., 2016,
p. 41). They propose a meshed functioning which involves “a
broadly hierarchical division of control responsibilities” along
a vertical axis, with top-down cognitive control “focused on
strategic aspects of performance and [bottom-up] automatic
processes more concerned with implementation” (Christensen
et al., 2016, p. 43). Control is mediated, not by explicit inferences,
but by “situated awareness,” an awareness that is “constructed”
over time with the help of attentional control.
To help us understand how the notion of a meshed
architecture can generalize more broadly to situated cognition
and contribute to an explanation of functional integration and
task dependency discussed above, we propose the following
clarifications. First, we suggest that the cognitive processes
involved in performance are complex and varied and can include
a full register that goes from explicit conscious control to implicit
pre-reflective consciousness. Second, we argue that control is not
just top-down but can also be intrinsic to bottom-up processes.
Third, we argue for the importance of affective factors in
modulating intrinsic control features. And fourth, especially in
regard to situated cognition, it is even more important to consider
that the mesh is complicated by a form of horizontal integration.
The horizontal axis of integration includes ecological, social, and
cultural/normative factors that extend beyond the performing
agent but nonetheless constrain or contribute to performance. By
making these clarifications, we hope to provide a more adequate
view of how functional integration and task dependency work
in situated cognition.
COMPLEX COGNITION
The notion of a meshed architecture has been applied to
various types of performance, from athletic performance to
the performing arts of acting, dance, and music. Different
interpretations of a meshed architecture are possible, however,
depending on how we answer the first question about how
to understand the cognitive processes involved. Some theorists
think of these processes in terms of high-order cognition. For
example, in his discussion of theatrical acting, Cohen (2013,
p. 33) refers to the actor’s “preparatory thinking as she readies
herself for the role, and in-performance thinking, which, in an
ideal situation, is ‘aligned’ with the [performer’s] action.” For
Cohen, when the actor’s thinking is “properly aligned, her tasks
are integrated” (Cohen, 2013, p. 16). This, as Tribble (2016)
indicates in her discussion of the meshed architecture, would
be a top-down process for Cohen, where low-order processes
of embodied coping are modulated by higher-order, reflective
cognitive aspects.
Likewise, Montero (2010, 2015) challenges the idea that expert
performance is somehow effortless or thoughtless. She argues,
in opposition to Dreyfus, that for expert dancers, reflection and
body awareness are typically not detrimental to the performance.
For Montero (2016, p. 38), optimal performance often coincides
with reflective, thoughtful performance, where thoughtful means
“self-reflective thinking, planning, predicting, deliberation,
attention to or monitoring of . . . actions, conceptualizing . . .
actions, control, trying, effort, having a sense of the self, and
acting for a reason.” Montero (2015, p. 90) pointed to qualitative
studies in athletics where a more detailed type of conscious
monitoring improves performance (also see Shusterman, 2008
for a similar account).
One could think of this as a type of vertical alignment
between higher-order cognitive processes and lower-order motor
control processes, with different degrees of integration between
the higher- and lower-order processes. This is similar to what
Christensen et al. (2016, p. 43) have in mind as they describe
the mesh as a combination of cognitive (control-related) and
automatic processes: thus, “controlled and automatic processes
are closely integrated in skilled action, and . . . cognitive
control directly influences motor execution in many cases.”
This divides the vertical into two poles: cognitive at the top,
descending to do its job in a “smooth,” “adaptive,” or “effortful”
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fashion (Christensen et al., 2016, p. 52), and automatic bodily
processes at the bottom.
It is possible, however, that there are different degrees of
vertical integration in the meshed architecture. Again, this goes
back to how one answers the first question about the nature
of the cognitive processes involved. The answer shifts between
a phenomenology that involves a reflective monitoring and
one that involves a more minimal pre-reflective awareness. For
phenomenologists, pre-reflective self-awareness does not take the
body as an intentional object; it rather involves a “performative
awareness . . . that provides a sense that one is moving or doing
something, not in terms that are explicitly about body parts,
but in terms closer to the goal of the action” (Gallagher, 2005,
p. 73). Legrand (2007, p. 512) described this self-awareness in
the context of dance performance: “while dancing [a dancer] is
intensively attending to [his body]. But he is not attending to
it reflectively as an object. Rather, his [prereflective] awareness
of his body as subject is heightened” (see Legrand and Ravn,
2009). The expert dancer keeps this awareness “at the front” of his
experience without turning his action or his body into an explicit
intentional object (Legrand, 2007, p. 512).
In these various accounts, it seems that what Christensen
et al. (2016) call situated awareness can be a matter of
degree, ranging from thoughtful, reflective consciousness to
a thin performative pre-reflective awareness, with different
gradations in between, allowing for such variations as selective
target control, conscious monitoring, a sense of one’s rightly
configured body, performative awareness, and pre-reflective
awareness. The phenomenology of performance may thus be
complex and varied. Performers are able to shift across a
full register, from explicit conscious control to implicit pre-
reflective consciousness and to spontaneous body-schematic
processes, adjusting their attunement to changing conditions
through improvisation.
INTRINSIC CONTROL
One important question for clarifying the notion of functional
integration, as we indicated above, is whether we should consider
body-schematic processes as fully automatic. Christensen et al.
(2016) mentioned this issue with reference to Fitts and Posner
(1967, p. 14) who thought that component processes may
automate and Jonides et al. (1985) and Logan (1985) who
argued that motor control processes overall do not automate.
Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain seemed to treat body-
schematic processes as fully automatic and therefore in need of
cognitive control in the performance situation (see Stanley, 2011
for a similar view).
Evidence from kinematics, however, suggests that body-
schematic processes are not fully automatic and instead
are situation specific, adaptive, and highly dynamical, which
facilitates movement in particular situations and for specific
intentions. A particular action intention or goal requires the
alignment of lots of moving parts in a controlled integration,
across varying timescales, many of which are too fast for
conscious control. In this respect, however, body-schematic
processes are neither fully automatic (blindly doing the
same thing in each circumstance and therefore requiring
propositional guidance) nor “perfectly general” (Stanley, 2011)
but rather include a specificity that depends on an “enormous
number (which often reaches three figures) of degrees of
freedom” (Bernstein, 1984), as well as a complex temporal
organization involving anticipatory processes across skeletal
geometry, kinematic phase constraints, muscular geometry,
and the dynamics that characterize the relationship between
kinematics and geometry (Berthoz, 2000; Gallagher and Aguda,
2020). These complex processes come to align with a particular
intention, not automatically but in heedful attunement with the
particularities of the situation.
Functional integration within such constraints may tune
motoric organization to the point where it can become habitual –
which may mean close to automatic, or automatic in some aspects,
but not fully automatic. Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 143) argued
that a habit is formed when the body “acquires the power of
responding with a certain type of solution to a certain form of
situation.” Habit involves an intelligent response, characterized
by openness and adaptivity, so that in familiar or unfamiliar
situations, the body learns to cope. As such, intelligence is built
into the movement. Instead of blind automatic repetition, habit
is intrinsically intelligent. John Dewey likewise distinguished
between intelligent and routine habit.
Repetition [i.e., automaticity] is in no sense the essence of habit.. . .
The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways
or modes of response. . .. Habit means special sensitiveness or
accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections
and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts
(Dewey, 1922, p. 42).
On this view, performance involves not simply a top-down
integration of cognition constraining or guiding automatic
processes. Motoric processes in expert performance are already
context sensitive, anchored in the situation, but at the same time
smart, open, and adaptive, such that they elicit or shape or enable
the cognitive elements required for performance. Not only are
such cognitive elements, as already noted, complex, including
heedful and goal-oriented forms of (attentive, perceptual)
consciousness, selective target control, conscious monitoring
of action, a sense of one’s rightly configured body, and/or
a heightened pre-reflective awareness, but also in such cases,
mindfulness is not simply imported from the top; it is already
built into the bottom, and again in some cases, such habitual
processes may be what guides any need for more reflective
cognitive processes. We can call this a kind of intrinsic control.
To summarize, for Christensen et al. (2016), the meshing
involves a vertical axis of top-down cognitive control that
introduces guidance for bodily processes that remain, at the
bottom, automatic. This particular conception of the hybrid
mesh, as Høffding and Satne (2019) suggested, is similar to
the hybrid car that combines two different elements, battery
and fuel. In contrast, they suggested that the mesh may be
closer to a fusion – more like an okapi (a unique animal
born of zebra and giraffe) than a hybrid car that alternates
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between the current of automaticity and the fuel of high-
octane cognition1. An okapi-style mesh, on our view, has a
more integrated structure. Practiced and habitual movements
(which are neither straightforwardly nor fully nor necessarily
automatic) play an important role in an intrinsic control
process. Variations in heedful and targeted (attentive, perceptual)
awareness are constrained and enabled by a consolidation of fine,
detailed motor control (body-schematic) processes, which are
not perfectly general or automatic but attuned to the specifics
of the situation.
AFFECT AND HORIZONTAL MESHING
We can get a better idea of what other factors contribute
to the meshed architecture by considering an example of
musical performance. Simon Høffding’s (2019) study of the
Danish String Quartet provided some evidence that the meshed
architecture involves both a complex vertical and horizontal
integration. Thus, for example, concerning the vertical axis, we
find considerations, similar to those above, about the role of
thoughtful performance ranging from explicit reflective thinking
to pre-reflective awareness and, in some cases, a form of deep
absorption where close to automatic processes of the body
schema do most of the work. Along this line, Høffding and
Satne (2019) interpreted the notion of a meshed architecture
as focused on mediating processes rather than the all-or-
nothing “automatic” versus “full cognitive” control (also see
Salice et al., 2017).
The other factors that Høffding’s analysis considers, in
addition to the reciprocal vertical integration of cognition and
body-schematic attunement, include affect but also the music
itself and intersubjectivity, i.e., the other players. We conceive of
the latter two factors as clearly on a horizontal axis which reaches
aspects that most theorists would consider as constitutive of the
agent’s situation. Affectivity, however, is central and may define
the vertical–horizontal intersection.
Affect in the broadest sense includes emotion processes but
also more general and basic bodily states such as hunger,
fatigue, and pain. Affect, or what Michelle Maiese (2018)
calls “affective framing,” shapes our ability to cope with the
surrounding world (Ratcliffe, 2012; Colombetti, 2014) and,
along with skills and habits, introduces possible modulations
of functional integration with that world. Affect may work
differently in different types of skilled actions, for example, in
various athletic performances and in the different performing
arts. The important differences may have to do with the way that
affective factors are integrated with motoric/agentive factors – the
kinetic and kinesthetic feelings associated with body-schematic
processes and how all of these processes functionally integrate
with environmental constraints and affordances. Affect/emotion
1Christensen and Sutton (2019) seemed to move closer to the okapi model. They
relaxed the strong dualism between cognition and automaticity (an either–or
arrangement), opting for more hybrid or pluralist (both–and) arrangements: “in
which there are multiple levels of control, including lower-level, fast perception-
action loops and higher-level loops that integrate more widely and process
more abstract information, with the loops functioning in intimate interaction”
(Christensen and Sutton, 2019, p. 160).
may involve expressive movement, as in dance – movement
that is like gesture and language but nonetheless depends
on motor control – although it goes beyond simple motor
control or instrumental action. There are different mixes or
integrations of expressive and instrumental movements in the
different contexts of performance – in athletics, dance, or musical
performance, for example.
The body schema does not work independently to deliver
technically proficient movement, to which an expressive
style is then added as something motivated by specific and
perhaps occasion-relative emotions. Affective processes directly
shape body-schematic processes, slowing them or speeding
them or leading them to a certain initial posture that may
influence performance or change how agents are functionally
situated. Accordingly, affect modulates functional integration.
Affect and body-schematic processes are part of the vertical
mesh in expert performance – but they also allow for an
integration attuned to targets and environmental features in the
performance situation.
In the context of musical performance, once we start to think
about the music itself and the other performers, for example,
we come to an enriched conception of the meshed architecture
that incorporates a form of horizontal integration. In this respect,
ecological, normative, cultural, and intersubjective aspects of
the physical and social environments, including physical and
social affordances, play a role and contribute to task-dependent
structures in performance. For example, in Høffding’s analysis,
the musical instruments, the performance space, and the music
itself shape the musical performance. The style of music, whether
one is playing from a score, or whether improvisation occurs –
these factors establish different roles and tasks and specify
different possible dynamics in performance. All of this, in line
with embodied-enactive conceptions of affordance-based action
and cognition, as well as ecological psychology’s conception
of resonance, helps to show that what makes performance
what it is is not entirely inside the performer, whether she
be musician, dancer, athlete, or expert in everyday affairs. For
example, the individual performer affectively resonates with and
through the music. Playing the musical notes initiates a resonance
between the sounds one creates and the musical sounds in the
environment made by other musicians.
This resonance may be driven by (1) consciously anticipated,
and sometimes planned, notes and/or (2) feedback from
awareness of the sounds that are actually created during
performance. On one hand, as the music unfolds, the
performance environment is constituted as a niche of musical
affordances. The sounds that a musician produces could thus
successfully or unsuccessfully resonate with the affordances in
the environment. On the other hand, anticipatory processes
and any short-term planning involved while playing suggest
intraorganism resonant loops constantly underlying the
performance (Ryan and Gallagher, 2020).
The combination of these respective elements is the
mesh between anticipatory control, practiced/skilled bodily
movements, and the affordances presented by the music and the
environment more generally.
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As one engages in a particular performance, one’s agency
(or sense of agency) may be modulated (causally influenced)
by affect but also by the quality and quantity of affordances
available. When, for example, the performer “can ‘feel’ that her
motor system has the right configuration” (Christensen et al.,
2016), this configuration is just the right one to mesh with the
specifics of the performer’s physical and social environments.
Høffding (2019, p. 244) called this “interkinaesthetic affectivity”
(see Salice et al., 2017; Høffding and Satne, 2019). Neither body-
schematic processes nor affective processes are isolated from the
agent’s environment; rather, they are attuned to both stabilities
and variations in environmental factors, including other agents.
The performance and the cognition involved in it are situated,
i.e., functionally integrated with the environment. Likewise,
environmental factors, including music and interpersonal
relations, can facilitate emotion regulation or regulation of affect
more generally (Krueger, 2014, 2019).
The environment where performance takes place is not only
physically but also socially, culturally, and normatively defined.
Performance in a concert hall or in a church may be quite
different from performance in a stadium or a pub or in the
open air. That we are playing music with others, and who those
others are, how skilled they are, and how long we have interacted
with them – all of these factors can impact performance (Clarke
et al., 2015). If one is playing music with others, there will be
an intersubjective and affective resonance between an individual’s
performance and the performance of other musicians. This may
be mediated by the music itself, by conscious, non-conscious,
and/or non-verbal perceptual cues in the others’ embodied
performance (see Høffding, 2019; Høffding and Satne, 2019). In
some cases, there may also be resonance between the musical
group and the audience. These different situations do not entail
autonomous high-church cognitive processes – as if what is
required is a thinking or reflective contemplation. The performer
does not think: “I’m in the concert hall playing with my quartet;
therefore I should play in this style.” It is rather that the concert
hall and the people I am making music with elicit a specific
feeling and style.
In some cases, a strong functional integration can be found in a
form of musical joint attention, a shared sense of the music, a kind
of entrainment and sensorimotor synchronization with the other
players that produces a joint musical experience that approaches
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeity.
The intercorporeal inclusion of the other musician can be said
to alter and expand the sense of agency, such that I no longer
primarily attend egoically to my agency, my movements, my
interpretation but see the entire setting, music, body, instrument,
and even fellow musicians as one large agent. This is an affective
and bodily we-intentionality: a musical intercorporeity or musical
interkinesthetic affectivity (Høffding, 2019, p. 244).
The meshing of the horizontal and vertical axes may also
involve “joint body schemas” in practices that have been shown
to extend an individual’s peripersonal space to include the
other person, evidenced in changes to neuronal and behavioral
processes (Soliman and Glenberg, 2014). As Soliman and
Glenberg showed, these body-schematic effects are not simply
modulated top-down by cultural practices, but rather, such
social and cultural factors are incorporated into body-schematic
processes which, in turn, express them in motoric performance.
The situation of performance thus involves distributed and
temporally extended processes that include all relevant variables –
embodied, ecological, intersubjective/social, and cultural. These
are not the accomplishments of narrow processes taking place
just in-the-head, or strictly on a vertical axis, but are processes
that extend into the world, meshed with the structures of our
intercorporeal and material engagements.
Accordingly, there are multiple complex factors that extend
on the horizontal axis and that shape the situation in which
the agent is embedded. The notion of task dependency, where
action may be defined by a particular role in the performance,
is clearly relevant at this point, although it varies across different
types of performance. Returning to the example of the standard
tonal jazz performance mentioned in the first section, we find
there clear normative task-dependent constraints that specify
performance. Such constraints will vary across some proportion
of functional integration and task dependency defining both
vertical and horizontal meshing. Accordingly, how the “head,”
the solos, and the outro actually play out will in varying degrees
depend on not just the vertical mesh of cognitive and intrinsic
body-schematic control for each individual player but also on our
interactions with co-players, on the music itself, and on affective
modulations that may permeate the entire situation.
CONCLUSION: PERFORMANCE AND
SITUATED COGNITION AS MUTUALLY
ENLIGHTENING
We have argued that the notion of a meshed architecture can
generalize beyond performance studies and contribute more
broadly to an understanding of situated cognition. Once we
understand that performance is not mindless, the model of
a meshed architecture allows us to specify not only how
cognition plays a role in performance but also how other factors
situate performance. In regard to this model, we proposed
four clarifications: (1) that the cognitive processes involved in
performance are complex and varied and can include a full
register that goes from explicit conscious control to implicit pre-
reflective consciousness; (2) that control is not just top-down
but can also be intrinsic to bottom-up processes; (3) that the
mesh is complicated by the horizontal integration of ecological,
social, and cultural/normative factors that extend beyond the
performing agent but nonetheless constrain or contribute to
performance; and (4) that affective factors are central for both
modulating intrinsic control features and integrating the vertical
and horizontal axes of the mesh. By making these clarifications,
we have provided a more adequate view of how functional
integration and task dependency work in situated cognition.
Accordingly, we think that the meshed architecture model
of performance provides a way to explicate various processes
involved in situated cognition and helps to make the concepts
of functional integration (the coupling of agent and world) and
task dependency (most typically defined by social, cultural, and
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normative factors on the horizontal axis) less abstract. At the
same time, notions of situated cognition that involve functional
integration and task dependency help to enrich the conception of
a meshed architecture.
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